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Preface 
By William Savedoff 
This study was commissioned as part of a project to assess the effects of implementing 
REDD+ programs on indigenous peoples who live in or near tropical forests. This study 
complements broader reviews of the global evidence and case studies in other countries 
to see whether concerns that REDD+ programs would harm indigenous peoples have 
indeed materialized.  
In this case study of Guyana, Tim Laing places the advent of REDD+ programs within 
the country’s long history of mistrust between indigenous peoples and the government; 
fundamental disputes over rights and title to land; and an unforeseen rise in gold mining. 
The study shows that REDD+ has had minimal effects on Guyana’s forests and 
indigenous peoples due, in part, to its slow and imperfect implementation. Furthermore, 
the government’s strategy for keeping deforestation rates low—promoting economic 
growth in sustainable low-carbon economic activities—also turned out to be ineffective 
against the major driver of deforestation during this period, namely gold mining. 
Nevertheless, the initial excitement and fears over REDD+ funding opened political 
channels and funding sources for indigenous communities that did not previously exist. 
The paper tells a story of a public policy initiative that was implemented imperfectly 
within a broader national political contest and economic forces which, at this stage, is 
neither a grand success nor a fearsome debacle.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2009 Guyana and Norway signed a ground-breaking agreement, creating the world’s 
second largest national-level Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) scheme. Guyana would receive up to US$250 million of 
performance-related finance over five years, depending on how well it controlled its 
deforestation rate. The scheme had the potential to provide significant finance and 
incentives to change behaviour in relation to the country’s primary forest resource. 
Finance was to be used to implement the country’s Low Carbon Development Strategy 
(LCDS) that aimed to decarbonise the power grid, provide incentives for low-carbon 
businesses, and promote development of indigenous communities through securing land 
title and funding development projects. The scale of the agreement had the potential to 
significantly impact indigenous communities both positively and negatively, and was thus 
the focus of significant attention within and outside these communities from its very 
inception. This report investigates the perceptions, hopes, and fears of indigenous 
communities and related stakeholders at the beginning of the REDD+ agreement, and 
how the actual implementation of REDD+ has affected these same communities.  
To answer these questions, the report draws on a number of sources. A review of 
secondary literature including peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken. Analysis 
of data on deforestation from Guyana’s Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System 
(MRVS) was also conducted to understand the impact the agreement has had on 
deforestation in the country as a whole, and in indigenous communities in particular. To 
supplement this secondary data interviews were conducted with leaders of indigenous 
communities, indigenous non-governmental organisations and other experts on 
indigenous affairs in the country.  
From this analysis, several key findings were drawn. In the country as a whole and in 
indigenous communities, the start of REDD+ was accompanied by optimism, and 
concerns over land rights and worries regarding the nature and quantity of information 
provided an early flurry of consultative activity. As REDD+ has been implemented (or 
at least as time has passed), much of the early energy surrounding REDD+ has ebbed 
away. Delivery of finance and implementation of projects have been slow and the 
promise of benefits has been unrealised. Costs have also been small with few conditions 
or firm policies to reduce deforestation imposed.  
The lack of both benefits and costs (through the slow delivery of finance) could be 
attributed, in part, to the complex nature of the institutional structure through which 
REDD+ finance flowed, which was created, in part, to satisfy the myriad of safeguards 
that needed to be met, along with the limited capacity within the Government of 
Guyana.  
Greater impacts from the REDD+ agreement may be gained by the country if shifts in 
mind-set within government can be translated from paper to action, and if the slow 
mainstreaming of REDD+ and low-carbon development into the country—through 
NGOs as much as government—continues. REDD+ and the concept of green 
development seems to have survived, at least in part, despite major changes in 
government. However, the greatest challenges are likely still to come regarding how to 
build an opt-in mechanism that fairly rewards all indigenous communities given the large 
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inherent differences between communities, how to integrate extractive industries such as 
mining, into REDD+, and how to keep a focus on protection of the environment and 
natural resources in the light of a potential pending oil boom. 
This report draws on primary and secondary research from indigenous communities in 
Guyana, indigenous organisations, and international experts to answer three major 
questions: 
1. How was the REDD+ agreement with Norway perceived by indigenous people 
in Guyana at its outset? 
2. How have perceptions changed as the REDD+ agreement has been enacted and 
evolved? 
3. What have been the impacts of the REDD+ agreement upon deforestation in 
indigenous communities? 
Section 2 provides background on Guyana for those unfamiliar with its history, politics 
and forest policies, or the character of the REDD+ Agreement Guyana signed with 
Norway in 2009. Section 3 outlines the methodology adopted in this report. Section 4 
provides a historical, legal, and social context to indigenous communities in Guyana. 
Section 5 discusses the concerns and hopes of indigenous communities at the inception 
of the REDD+ agreement. Section 6 presents data on the evolution of deforestation in 
Guyana and in indigenous communities across the period of the REDD+ agreement. 
Section 7 discusses the evolution of the REDD+ agreement and the perceptions of 
indigenous communities. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Guyanese History and Context for REDD+ 
Guyana is a small, heavily forested country in South America. It is approximately the size 
of the United Kingdom, and has a sparse population of around 750,000, the majority of 
which live along a narrow coastal strip. The country is categorised by a number of 
distinct geographic areas, with the coast dominated by urban areas and agriculture, and 
the interior of the country consisting of primary and secondary rainforest and savannah 
areas. The country has experienced historically low levels of deforestation, partially 
through policy and partially through circumstance, lack of economic development and 
lack of population pressure. It is against this backdrop that it engaged in a major 
REDD+ agreement beginning in 2009.  
2.1 Economy 
Traditionally the Guyanese economy was based upon the agricultural sectors of first 
sugar and then rice cultivation. The country was colonised by the Dutch and then the 
British, with the former constructing a series of dams, polders, canals, and dikes that 
allowed for agricultural exploitation of the coastland swamp area. Slaves from Ireland 
were initially brought over to provide labour for the industry along with indigenous 
populations, followed swiftly by those from Africa who came to dominate the workforce 
with enslavement of the indigenous communities proving difficult. With the abolition of 
slavery, the Afro-Guyanese population left the sugar plantations to take up small 
holdings or to venture into the interior rainforest areas to undertake “pork-knocking” 
(small-scale gold mining). To replace the slaves, indentured workers from Ireland, 
Portugal, China and India were brought into the country, with the latter dominating the 
new workforce in the industry.  
Independence was followed by a decline in the sugar industry, due to declining global 
prices and increasing international competition, and an increasing expansion of the rice 
industry, especially in the agricultural areas now populated by the descendants of Indian 
indentured workers. The indigenous population remained predominantly in interior 
locations, mainly separate from the cash economy. The 1970s and 1980s were dominated 
by a period of introspective socialist dictatorial rule by an Afro-Guyanese dominated 
party—and a period of economic decline. The 1990s brought democracy and a transition 
of power, along with a loosening of economic restrictions and an increased focus on 
resource extraction of timber, gold and diamonds in interior locations. This was 
accompanied by an increase in infrastructure and communication with interior 
communities, bringing many indigenous communities gradually into the cash economy.  
The reliance on extractive industries, rice and sugar continues to this day, with little 
diversification of the economy. A gold price boom in the mid to late 2000s increased the 
country’s reliance on gold mining as a source of growth and foreign exchange. For 
example, raw gold accounted for 58 percent of exports by value in the period January to 
May 2017 (Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2017), and between 2006 and 2016, value-added 
from the gold industry increased on average 15 percent per annum, compared to average 
growth in GDP as a whole of 4.2 percent. At the same time the forestry sector, 
dominated by overseas—mainly East Asian—investors, experienced declines due to the 
low productivity of the forest, high extraction costs and over-exploitation of key species, 
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with value-added in the sector falling by 1 percent per annum between 2006 and 2016 
(Guyana Bureau of Statistics, 2017). 
Many years of onshore and offshore oil exploitation reached fruition in 2015 with large 
offshore fields discovered by Exxon Mobil, with production due to start in 2020 
(Reuters, 2017). To date, five offshore wells have been found to have commercial 
quantities of oil with latest estimates of reserves of 2.8 billion barrels of oil and potential 
production at around 300,000 – 400,000 barrels per day (Stabroek News, 2017). If 
exploited, the find would place Guyana amongst the largest Latin American oil 
producers. Significant focus is being placed on the future potential revenue to the 
country from the exploitation of the resource, placing question marks over alternative 
revenue streams such as REDD+ - though the offshore nature of the resource does 
remove the spectre of land conflicts that have occurred in other countries with oil 
extraction.  
Guyana is classified as a middle-income country with GDP per capita of US$4,457 in 
2016 and an HDI of 0.638 and an overall rank of 127.1 Over the last 20 years, growth 
has been steady but sluggish at an average of 4.2 percent and there are large regional 
disparities in wealth between the coastal capital, Georgetown, and the interior locations, 
mainly populated by indigenous communities.  
2.2 Politics 
Guyana’s current political make-up was forged in the battle for independence from the 
British in the 1950s and the subsequent post-independence environment. The 
independence struggle was led by a multiracial People’s Progressive Party (PPP) led by 
Forbes Burnham and Dr Cheddi Jagan. Following intervention by the British authorities 
after the 1953 elections, the party split with Forbes Burnham to form the People’s 
National Congress (PNC) dominated by Afro-Guyanese, and leaving the PPP to become 
an Indo-Guyanese dominated party. Further intervention from the British and the CIA 
due to fears over the communist tendencies of Jagan and the PPP led to the PNC 
winning the pre-independence election of 1964. 
Under the PNC and the increasing dictatorial rule of Forbes Burnham, the country took 
a turn towards socialism and a series of rigged elections took place in the 1970s and 
1980s. Following Burnham’s death in 1985, the vice-president Desmond Hoyte became 
the new president and undertook economic reform, embrace of the private sector and, 
through the interventions of Jimmy Carter, led the country toward democracy (The 
Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, 1993).  
In 1992 the first internationally recognised free and fair elections since independence 
brought the PPP to power in coalition with the Civic Party, bringing Dr Cheddi Jagan to 
the presidency. Jagan died in 1997 while in office, and—after a brief period of rule by 
Jagan’s American-born wife, Janet—Finance Minister Bharrat Jagdeo took on the 
Presidency. Further elections followed in 2001 and 2006. Economic growth had been 
steady but concerns over ethnic marginalisation, allegations of government corruption, 
                                                     
1 Data from http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries 
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and the effect of the large out-migration of Guyana’s young and educated hindered 
progress and increased opposition support. The 2011 elections brought a new era to 
Guyana’s politics with a new coalition, A Partnership of National Unity (APNU) 
(consisting of the PNC and a number of smaller parties) and the multi-racial Alliance for 
Change (that had been on the rise since 2006), winning a parliamentary majority for the 
first time, while the PPP-C retained the presidency with Donald Ramotar taking over 
from Jagdeo, who had reached the end of his self-imposed two term limit.  
This new political make-up proved to be unstable with the PPP-C government unable to 
pass budgets and legislation, and the situation collapsed with Ramotar suspending 
Parliament, and new elections were held in 2015. The APNU and the AFC joined 
together to form a grand coalition to defeat the PPP-C and won a narrow victory, 
retaining control of parliament, and taking the Presidency, with David Granger 
becoming the new president. 
The recent political change in Guyana has been a function, of among other things, a 
change in ethnic circumstance. Voting is predominantly along ethnic lines, implying that 
the increasing population of Amerindians and mixed race persons have become 
increasingly important. The PPP were successful in cultivating the Amerindian vote 
throughout the 1990s with reforms such as the creation of a Ministry of Amerindian 
Affairs (later renamed Ministry of Indigenous Peoples Affairs under President Granger) 
and the promotion of prominent indigenous figures to senior cabinet posts, such as 
Carolyn Rodrigues serving as Foreign Minister under the Ramotar administration. 
However, this policy seems to have reached its limits in the 2011 and 2015 elections, 
with support for other parties growing in Amerindian regions—indeed the largest swing 
away from the PPP in 2015 occurred in the remote, predominantly indigenous Region 8, 
contributing in part to the change in political circumstance. Issues surrounding lack of 
broad-based development, increasing perceptions of corruption and fatigue after twenty 
years of the same government, may have contributed to the increased attractiveness of 
opposition parties both to indigenous communities and across the country as a whole. 
2.3 Forest Resource 
Guyana couples this low level of development with an extremely high level of forest 
cover, estimated at 84 percent of its total area, and a very low historic rate of 
deforestation. The country contains one of the most intact tracts of primary tropical 
rainforest anywhere in the world (Osbourne & Kiker, 2005), with an estimated 45 
percent of the forest being primary (FAO, 2010). 
The majority of the forest lies in public hands either through the State Forest Estate, 
which accounts for 66 percent of forested areas, or State Lands, that account for a 
further 14 percent. Another 14 percent of forested areas are found on titled Amerindian 
lands (approximately equivalent to the overall percentage of land owned by indigenous 
communities in the country), with the remaining 6 percent on private lands (Guyana 
Forestry Commission, 2015). Management of the State Forest Estate lies with the 
Guyana Forestry Commission, while Amerindian communities have the right to manage 
forests on their own land, unless they plan to sell timber outside their communities. 
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Historic pressures on the forest have come from infrastructure and timber harvesting, 
along with small levels of gold mining activity. With the growth in gold mining in the 
2000s, assisted by technology and labour imported from Brazil, mining (and mining 
infrastructure) became the predominant cause of deforestation, accounting for 85 
percent of deforestation in 2014, up from 51 percent between 1990 and 2000 (Guyana 
Forestry Commission, 2015). Forest degradation has occurred both through mining and 
forestry activity with 16,000 hectares degraded between 2010 and 2014—predominantly 
through mining (Guyana Forestry Commission, 2015). 
Future scenarios of forest loss are few and far between, and have been overtaken by 
events. The most widely reported study is that produced by McKinsey & Company in 
2008 that predicted that forest loss could rise to 4.3 percent per annum over the 25 years 
subsequent to the report, mainly through widespread agricultural expansion (Office of 
the President, 2008). The study was widely criticised and although Guyana has 
experienced recent increases in deforestation, it has not reached anywhere near the 
predicted levels. The huge agricultural expansion predicted in the study has failed to 
materialise (whether through policy or due to some heroic assumptions regarding rate of 
clearance and productivity of soils in the study), while the study actually underestimated 
deforestation from the mining industry.  
2.4 REDD+ Agreement 
It is against this backdrop of high forest cover, historically low rates of deforestation and 
low levels of economic development that Guyana started to promote itself as a potential 
REDD+ country. As early as 2006 then President Bharat Jagdeo is reported to have 
made a public offer to the UK to “deploy almost our entire rainforest – which is the size of 
England – in the long term service of the world’s battle against climate change.”2 
The offer came to nothing but through discussions between the Guyanese government, 
Prince Charles’ Rainforest Project and other parties in 2009 Guyana signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of Norway to:  
“foster partnership between Guyana and Norway on issues of climate change, biodiversity and 
sustainable low carbon development”3 
and with an objective of “the establishment of a framework for results-based Norwegian financial 
support to Guyana’s REDD-plus efforts.”4 
The MOU was followed by a Joint Concept Note (JCN) that set out the terms of the 
agreement whereby up to US$250 million of performance related payments would be 
made to Guyana over five years. There were two sets of performance criteria against 
which payments would be made: 
                                                     
2 Stabroek News, (2007) 
3 The Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana (Guyana) and the Government of the Kingdom 
of Norway (Norway), (2009) 
4 ibid 
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1. Guyana keeping its deforestation rate below a target of 0.275 percent computed 
via the combined reference level methodology; and, 
2. Guyana meeting a set of Indicators of Enabling Activities including the 
establishment of a strategic framework, a continuous multi-stakeholder 
consultation process, a strong governance environment and respect of the rights 
of indigenous peoples and other local forest communities as regards to 
REDD+.  
Money received under the MOU was to be spent by Guyana in achieving the aims of its 
new Low-Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) launched in June, 2009. The LCDS had 
eight key strategic areas (Office of the President, 2013): 
1. Renewable Energy—focusing on the development of the Amaila Falls 
Hydropower project 
2. Amerindian Development 
3. Amerindian Land Titling 
4. Expanding the Digital Economy and Avoiding a Digital Divide 
5. Support for Medium and Small Enterprises and Vulnerable Groups 
6. The establishment of a Centre for Bio-Diversity Research and Curriculum 
Development at the University of Guyana 
7. Climate Resilience and Adaptation 
8. MRV and other LCDS supporting tasks 
9. Management of the LCDS was placed in the Office of the President, through a 
new Office of Climate Change that reported direct to the President. 
A consultation process began in June, 2009 with 15 sub-national consultations being 
held over the next two months, with just over 3,000 people attending (Laing T. , 2014). 
A committee was established to initially deal with the consultations, but whose implicit 
mandate grew to cover the whole strategy. This Multi-Stakeholder Steering Committee 
(MSSC) consisted of members including government agencies, industry bodies, and 
Amerindian NGOS. The largest Amerindian NGO, the Amerindian People’s 
Association (APA) refused to join the committee until a clear Terms of Reference was 
issued (Laing T. , 2014).  
The introduction of the MSSC was an interesting development in Guyanese public 
policy though it has received much criticism due to question marks over its composition, 
its capacity, its role, and its freedom from political processes (Bulkan J. , 2017; Laing T. , 
2014). 
The LCDS contained essentially a shopping list of projects that the government wanted 
to implement, ranging from a 250MW hydropower facility at Amaila Falls (in the interior 
Region 8), to two specific projects aimed at the indigenous (Amerindian) community. 
The first of these was the completion of titling of Amerindian land under the provisions 
of the much criticised 2006 Amerindian Act that only grants rights to Amerindian 
communities that have received formal title. The second was the establishment of an 
Amerindian Development Fund (ADF) that had the aim of supporting projects in titled 
Amerindian communities from Community Development Plans (CDPs). Full details of 
the actual and proposed spend for funds earned through the MOU with Norway are 
given in Table 1, drawn from the revised 2013 draft of the LCDS. 
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Table 1: Investment of Funds from Climate Services, 2009-2014 (US$ millions)  
Sectors 2009-2011 2012 2013 2014 
Earned and Projected Paymentsa 
Low End 115 45 45 45 
High End   74 74 
     
Allocation to LCDS Investmentsb 
Low Carbon Economic Infrastructure 
Amaila Falls 80    
Low Carbon Transportation   1 1 
High Potential Low Carbon Sectors 
Micro and Small Enterprise 10 5 5 5 
Eco-Tourism Development  2 2 2 
Aquaculture  3 3 3 
Hinterland Development 
Amerindian Development Fund 6 5 5 5 
Amerindian Land Titling 7.5    
ICT Hinterland Access 
Programme 
 3 3 3 
Hinterland Distance Learning 
through ICT  2 2 2 
Human Capital 
Bio-Diversity Research Centre 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 
Institutional Strengthening 6.5 7 7 7 
Curriculum Development 0.5    
Adaptation 
Canal Rehabilitation 2    
Hinterland Adaptation 
Measures    10 
Coastal Infrastructure  15 12-40 7-36 
Comprehensive Adaptation and 
Climate Resilience Programme  0.5   
Strengthening of the Hydro-
metrological Service Monitoring 
System 
 1   
Total 115 45 45-74 45-74 
Source: Office of the President, (2013) 
Notes: a. 2009-2011 reflects actual payments. 2012 onwards reflects projects payments as of 2013.  
b. Allocation to investments reflects when the allocation decision was made—with 2013 onwards being 
projected plan as of 2013. 
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Other projects have also fallen under the LCDS banner but weren’t funded directly via 
the MOU. An example is the Hinterland Electrification Programme, which by 2012 had 
provided several thousand households with solar panels, along with schools and health 
centres (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014). 
An important (as yet unrealised) component of the early LCDS and discussions 
surrounding the MOU was the creation of an opt-in provision whereby Amerindian 
communities who held title to their land could receive payment for protecting the forest 
within their lands. This “opt-in mechanism” has been in design since the early days of 
the REDD+ agreements but has yet to be operationalised. A pilot community (Muritaro) 
has been selected and a structure has been designed through a consultancy project.  
A key aspect of the initial structure of the REDD+ agreement, and the LCDS that it 
funded, is the lack of direct mechanisms through which finance received from Norway 
would affect deforestation directly. Outside of the opt-in provision for indigenous 
communities there were (and there still are) no proposals to provide finance to those 
directly causing deforestation whether to change behaviour or encourage better practice. 
No clear restrictions have been placed on actors, above and beyond the proposal for 
greater enforcement of existing legislation as it relates to forestry and mining. Indeed the 
main mechanism through which the LCDS was designed to reduce deforestation was to 
create economic growth in other sectors, and allow the Guyanese economy to develop 
without succumbing to potential future pressures from extensive agriculture, whether 
from Guyanese investors or from abroad.  
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3. Methodology 
A three-part methodology has been adopted to answer the key questions of interest: 
1. How was the REDD+ agreement with Norway perceived by indigenous people 
in Guyana at its outset? 
2. How have perceptions changed as the REDD+ agreements has been enacted 
and evolved? 
3. What have been the impacts of the REDD+ agreement upon deforestation in 
indigenous communities? 
The first part involved a literature review of existing work on this area, including material 
from both peer-reviewed academic literature and also from the grey literature. Literature 
reviewed include academic papers such as Airey & Kruse, (2017), Bulkan, (2013). 
Bulkan, (2014) and Bellfied et al, (2015). These works were complemented by reviewing 
reports from organisations such as the Forest People’s Programme (La Rose, Griffiths, 
& Lunde, Taking stock: Indigenous peoples and low carbon development policies in 
Guyana, 2014) and the Mary Robinson Foundation (Mary Robinson Foundation, 2011). 
The second part involved sourcing and analysing data on the evolution of the forest 
during the period of the REDD+ agreement, focusing on the indigenous communities 
of Guyana. Data was sourced from the reports of the Guyana Forestry Commission’s 
Monitoring Reporting and Verification System (MRVS) (Guyana Forestry Commission, 
2015; Poyry and Guyana Forestry Commission, 2011; Guyana Forestry Commission and 
Indufor, 2012; Guyana Forestry Commission and Indufor, 2013; Guyana Forestry and 
Commission and Indufor, 2014).  
The third part involved semi-structured expert interviews with participants in Guyana 
and abroad. The interviews followed a structured interview guide (attached in Appendix 
1). Interviews ranged in duration between 30 to 90 minutes and took place in the UK 
and Guyana, with some conducted via Skype (three) and those in Guyana conducted by 
an interview assistant (five). Interviewees included representatives of the National 
Toshaos Council, the APA, Conservation International—Guyana and academic experts 
involved in research in Guyana. Interviewees were selected to include the major 
indigenous NGOs or those working closely with indigenous communities in the area of 
natural resource management, and Toshaos (Chiefs) involved in key aspects of the 
REDD+ process, including the village chosen as the pilot community for the opt-in 
process. 
The results of each of the parts of the methodology are integrated together and analysed 
in the following sections.  
  
12 
4. Indigenous Peoples of Guyana 
Guyana was originally settled by different semi-nomadic tribal groups including the 
Arawak and Caribs. Archaeological evidence of pottery and agricultural earthworks from 
the Arawak tribe have been dated to 5,000 years ago, amongst the oldest in the whole 
Amazonian region (Whitehead, Heckenberger, & Simon, 2010). Other tribal groups 
arrived at various points up to the 19th century, including the Akawois, the Warrous, the 
Macushis and Wapishanas, the Arecunas, the Patamonas and the Wai-Wais.  
The Dutch were the first colonial power to establish themselves in Guyana and signed 
formal treaties with indigenous communities, with the Dutch preserving the rights of 
indigenous nations to own and control their own land (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014).  
The colony changed hands between the British and the Dutch with the British finally 
bringing together three colonies, Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo, into British Guiana 
in 1831. The colony of British Guiana, and its Dutch predecessor was dominated by the 
production of sugar from a plantation system. Amerindian communities were involved 
as trading with the colonial powers (including annatto—a red-orange dye used in the 
colouring of Dutch cheeses), as slaves on early plantations, and also as plantation 
policemen. It has been much reported that many communities moved further into the 
interior to escape the growing colonial presence.5 A further important feature of the 
colonial period was the establishment of Christian missions in many areas of the country 
aimed to spread Christianity to the indigenous population. The legacy of these missions 
can be seen in the location and names of many current Amerindian titled communities 
such as the villages of Santa Rosa, Santa Mission and St Ignatius. 
The nineteenth century saw the abolition of slavery and the arrival of indentured East 
Indian workers to fill the gap on the plantations. New industries of gold mining, rice and 
bauxite grew in importance. Gold mining occurred in the interior of the country, with 
many freed African slaves engaging in “pork-knocking”—small scale itinerant mining 
activity. Changing economic circumstances were matched by slowly changing political 
dimensions under British rule, with increasing representation for the local populace in 
decision-making bodies. Increased representation also came for indigenous communities 
with a watershed moment arriving in 1957 when the first Amerindian Member of 
Parliament, the Arawakan Stephen Campbell, was elected.  
Ordinances relating to Amerindian land had been issued in 1902 and 1910, and an 
Amerindian Act passed in 1951 established three categories of Amerindian land: 
Districts, Areas and Villages, but failed to provide secure tenure for indigenous 
communities. For example, through the 1910 State Lands Acts Regulations Amerindians 
could live on ungranted or unlicensed State Lands but could not clear the forest nor 
cultivate the land (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014).  
As independence approached the issue of resolving these land issues grew (partially 
through the pressure of individuals such as Stephen Campbell—the first indigenous 
Member of Parliament (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014)), and with independence in 1966, an 
                                                     
5 See for example extracts from the Stabroek News reported at: 
http://www.guyanaundersiege.com/Cultural/Amerindians%20in%20Colonial%20History.htm 
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Amerindian Lands Commission was established, reporting back in 1969. As part of the 
British Guyana Independence Conference Report of 1965 independent Guyana was 
required to regularise Amerindian rights and specified that:  
“Amerindians should be granted legal ownership or rights of occupancy over areas and 
reservations or parts thereof where any tribe or community is now ordinarily resident or settled 
and other legal rights, such as rights of passage, in respect of any other lands where they now by 
tradition or custom de facto enjoy freedoms or permissions…legal ownership that comprise all 
rights normally attaching to such ownership.”6 
The Commission gathered Amerindian requests for recognition of lands and after two 
years of considering the land tenure situation of indigenous people, made a 
recommendation that 128 Amerindian communities receive land title covering 24,000 
square miles out of the 43,000 square miles requested by communities. Much of the 
justification given for this reduced amount of land was done on the basis that claims 
were excessive and beyond the ability to develop and administer (Griffiths & La Rose, 
2014).  
Following the Commission’s findings, in 1976, the 1951 Amerindian Act was amended 
to provide 64 Amerindian villages land title (UNDP, 2013), much reduced from the 
Commission’s findings, and the Act retained much of the power of the Minister to 
decide issues relating to land unilaterally. 
A further 10 communities were granted title in 1991. Both the Act and the land titling 
process have been much criticised (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014; UNDP, 2013) due to the 
extensive powers granted to the Minister to reduce and confiscate lands, and a large 
number of errors relating to surveying and demarcation.  
These issues, along with the fundamental objection that these legal structures rested on 
the tenet that the acquisition of sovereignty by the colonial powers removed any legal 
rights indigenous communities had to their lands, reportedly inconsistent with 
international law (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014), led to calls for a reform of the Amerindian 
Act and the land titling process. The review process for the Act began in 2002 with a set 
of major community level consultations—praised by many (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014). 
The Act, however, when passed in 2006 met with criticism in that it retained the power 
of the Minister of Amerindian Affairs7 to veto proposed title boundaries and retained 
the distinction between titled and untitled communities, although it removed the power 
of the government to extinguish title without consultation or consent.  
4.1 Current Legal Status of Indigenous Peoples 
The term Amerindian is legally defined in Guyana, via the 2006 Amerindian Act to mean 
any citizen of Guyana who: 
 
 
                                                     
6 Annex C, Section L. of the Independence Agreement as cited by Dooley & Griffiths, (2014) 
7 The Ministry was renamed the Ministry of Indigenous Peoples Affairs in 2015.  
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a) belongs to any of the native or aboriginal peoples of Guyana; or 
b) is a descendant of any person mentioned in paragraph (a) 
The 2006 Amerindian Act grants titled Amerindian communities the right to exclude 
entry for individuals entering the lands for travelling or for research. It creates a 
governance framework for Amerindian communities consisting of a Village Council 
comprising a Toshao (chief) and Councillors. The Act grants this body certain powers 
(such as making rules on the occupation and use of Village lands) and certain functions 
(such as to promote the sustainable use, protection and conservation of Village lands). 
The Act also establishes the National Toshaos Council (NTC), a body that consists of all 
Toshaos of titled communities in the country.  
Section 48(1) of the Act establishes that miners wishing to work on titled land must 
obtain the consent of the village before proceeding, and enter into a written agreement. 
However, villages do have not final right of refusal over large-scale mining projects, and 
the Minister can override village concerns if they deem it to be in the public interest. If 
such a decision was made the Minister is responsible for agreeing (in consultation with 
the Minister with responsibility for mining) the amount of fee and tribute to be paid to 
the village. This clause has caused consternation amongst indigenous communities based 
at least in part on previous bad experiences with large-scale prospecting encroaching on 
indigenous land with permission of the government (Colchester, La Rose, & James, 
2002), although no actual large-scale mining project has been implemented on 
indigenous titled land without the consent of the village involved, and hence this clause 
has never actually been activated.  
The Act also provides a framework whereby communities can apply for grants or 
extensions of titled land. Currently ninety-six Amerindian communities have legal title to 
their land,8 with an estimated two dozen main settlements without legal title and their 
commensurate rights (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014). Communities may apply for a grant of 
state lands if they meet two pre-conditions, as stated in The Act Section 60(1). First the 
community must have been in existence for at least 25 years, and secondly the 
community must have at least 150 persons. The decision to grant lands is ultimately the 
responsibility of the Minister of Indigenous Peoples Affairs—who is legislated to base 
his decision on supporting information submitted by the community that demonstrates 
their physical, traditional, cultural association or spiritual attachment to the land.  
Although the number of legal titled communities have increased a number of concerns 
have been voiced (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014) regarding both titled and untitled 
communities including: 
• inadequate land titles—including titles covering only a fraction of claimed land 
• problematic land titling and demarcation procedures—a lack of objective criteria 
for assessing land and resources claimed by communities; 
• map and boundary discrepancies—especially prevalent on maps held by 
resource management agencies. 
                                                     
8 Sourced from: https://moipa.gov.gy/land-tenure/ 
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A recent issue that has arisen regards the status of pre-existing resource rights and newly 
titled Amerindian communities. For example, the village of Issenuru were granted title in 
2007 to an area much smaller than that requested. Once title had been granted the village 
attempted to remove miners operating on their lands, however the High Court ruled in 
favour of the miner, upholding pre-existing mining rights over newly granted 
Amerindian land rights (Kaieteur News, 2013). These mining rights were in the form of 
pre-existing mining claims granted to the miner by the Guyana Geology and Mines 
Commission. These claims are technically valid for just a year at the time, but in reality 
are rolled over by miners for many years. The average duration that a claim was held for 
is almost 9 years, with some claims being held by miners for decades (Laing T. , Rights 
to the forest, REDD+ and elections: Mining in Guyana, 2015).  
The issue of miners operating on lands held by or under customary use by indigenous 
communities has raised great concerns across Guyana recently. Concerns have focused 
on the environmental degradation caused by mining activity including deforestation, 
siltation of rivers and contamination by mercury; and social issues caused by mining such 
as the influx of drugs and prostitution into communities (Colchester, La Rose, & James, 
2002; Hilson & Laing, 2017). 
Issues have also arisen in Guyana with the expansion and granting of new Protected 
Areas and indigenous lands. The expansion of the Kaieteur National Park in 1999 raised 
a number of issues with the neighbouring indigenous community of Chenapou who 
were unhappy that the park impinged on their traditional lands (Community of 
Chenapou, Amerindian People's Association and the Forest People's Programme, 2000). 
Issues have also arisen with the establishment of the Kanuku Mountains Protected Area 
in the south of the country (Guyana Environmental Protection Agency and Flora and 
Fauna International, 2002), with the establishment of a working group of indigenous 
leaders, the Kanuku Mountains Community Representative Group (KMCRG) aimed at 
resolving some of these issues. The major issues facing the communities from the 
establishment of these protected areas are that these protected areas could (and were) 
established on communities’ traditional lands (for which they lacked title) without free, 
prior and informed consent; and the establishment of the parks would extinguish 
communities’ rights to hunt, fish, travel or carry out any activity within the park (or the 
extended park as was the case with the Kaieteur National Park (La Rose, 2004). 
4.2 Economic Conditions of Indigenous Peoples 
Indigenous communities in Guyana generally engage in mixed livelihoods involving both 
subsistence and cash-based activities. Traditional activities such as rotational farming, 
hunting, fishing and gathering are partnered with salaried and non-salaried cash activities 
such as working within government-funded positions such as teachers or health workers, 
cash cropping, eco-tourism or working in extractive industries such as forestry and 
mining. A 2010 estimate placed just 10 percent of households in Amerindian 
communities as having members with full-time salaried positions (Griffiths & Anselmo, 
Indigenous Peoples and Sustainable Livelihoods in Guyana: An overview of experiences 
and potential opportunities, 2010), implying that most members of Amerindian 
communities are involved in a wide range of both cash and non-cash based activities. 
The balance between this mix, and between the different types of cash-based activities 
differs from community to community and from region to region with some areas and 
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villages earning more from eco-tourism, and others more from mining. Data on the 
value of the contribution of these different activities to different communities is not 
available, but this dependence on different activities implies that REDD+ schemes 
would have different implications across Amerindian communities.  
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5. Concerns and Hopes Regarding the REDD+ 
Agreement in Guyana 
The launching of the REDD+ agreement between Guyana and Norway in 2009 
occurred very rapidly and was perceived by many as happening with little or no input 
from the population as a whole, including the Amerindian community. The initial phase 
of REDD+ in Guyana consisted of a period of consultation regarding the Low-Carbon 
Development Strategy (LCDS) that occurred after the first draft was published.  
This consultation process initially started with national level consultations, followed by a 
second stage of regional consultations, targeting Amerindian communities and other 
stakeholders such as miners, loggers and other residents. Fifteen consultation sessions 
were held between June 19, 2009 and July 15, 2009, with over 2,900 people registered as 
attending, representing 222 communities. The comments and suggestions from these 
consultations were collected and collated by the Government of Guyana (Government 
of Guyana, 2009). According to this collation the most frequently reported comments 
included:  
• 1st: Support for the LCDS and initiative undertaken by the Government 
• 2nd: Land issues: Demarcation, Titling and Extension—if not received titles will 
villages still be able to opt in? 
• 5th: Will livelihoods of Amerindians, miners and loggers be affected? 
• 11th: Will traditional farming activities be affected? 
The most reported suggestions included: 
• 1st: The LCDS is difficult to understand. Simpler version is needed. Or pamphlet 
be made. 
• 2nd: People are ill prepared for the LCDS. Further discussions of LCDS with 
Villagers are needed. More information is needed or technical/legal advice. 
• 3rd: More time is needed for Amerindians to decide if they want to be part of 
Strategy. 
• 4th: Land Issues: Demarcation, Titling and Extension—needs to be addressed 
before any plans are made. 
Following these reported comments and the findings from the interviews, three key 
areas of concerns and hopes regarding the REDD+ agreement have been identified: 
1. Land rights 
2. Economic Concerns 
3. Consultation 
5.1. Land Rights 
The issue of land rights is perhaps the pervasive issue for indigenous communities in 
Guyana and has been the subject of a number of reports and papers (Dooley & 
Griffiths, 2014; Airey & Krause, 2017; Adams, 2013). 
The land rights issues stem from the historical context discussed above. Concerns fell 
into two main categories: those relating to how untitled communities could be involved 
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in the programme; and those relating to the importance of resolving existing land issues 
(relating to extension, titling, demarcation, etc.) before any discussion of the REDD+ 
agreement could continue.  
A clear example of the first can be seen in a comment from the consultation session held 
at Muritaro in Region 10 of the country9:  
How will communities which are not titled or gazetted benefit from the LCDS? 
Examples of the second can be seen in the comments from the consultation session held 
at Kamarang in Region 7:10 
Land issues should be addressed before any plans are made regarding the forests 
The Upper Mazaruni land case should be addressed.11 
The concerns regarding land rights issues in Guyana at the start of the REDD+ 
programme related to pre-existing issues regarding the lack of legal status of customary 
rights, the issue of some indigenous communities lacking any legal status, and the 
perceived inadequacy of previous attempts to legalise indigenous land ownership. There 
seemed to be less concern that REDD+ could lead to a land grab—as was perceived 
elsewhere (Larson, et al., 2013), at least not in regard to existing titled land.  
A major proposed component of the LCDS that could provide direct benefits to 
indigenous communities was the opt-in mechanism whereby communities could receive 
economic benefit from conserving their forest—a number of concerns and hopes were 
expressed in the consultations in this area. These included concerns relating to how 
opting in would change their usage rights, and how benefits could differ between 
communities, especially those with smaller amounts of forest area. Examples of these 
two issues can be seen from the consultation sessions at Kato (Region 8) and Muritaro 
(Region 10): 
How will the LCDS relate to logging and farming within titled communities if they Opt In? 
Some Amerindian villages are more forested (like Muritaro) and others less. If the initiative 
comes into place, would all the funds be shared in proportion to their forest coverage? 
A key issue that arose in a number of the consultations was the issue of rotational 
farming (or “slash and burn” as it is sometimes called). Rotational farming is a key 
livelihood of many indigenous communities in Guyana and involves clearing forest to 
create a farm, which is used for a number of years, before being left fallow to recover 
and a further patch of forest cleared. It is both a key livelihood activity and also an 
important cultural practice, and thus whether it would be allowed to continue under a 
policy regime where deforestation is controlled was an important question for many 
                                                     
9 The session covered a number of communities including Muritaro, Kumaka, Malali, De Veldt and Gateroy 
(Office of Climate Change, 2009a) 
10 Office of Climate Change, (2009b) 
11 The Upper Mazaruni land case dates back to 1998 when various communities sought to secure title to 
untitled lands. For more information see George & Almas, (2014). 
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communities. In the consultation sessions in Kamarang, Kato and Aishlaton (Region 9) 
comments related to just this point were made: 
Slash and burn should not be stopped 
How will slash and burn agriculture as being practiced by villages be affected by the LCDS? 
It is stated that in the Strategy traditional activities will not be affected however, there is a trade-
off. If the communities opt in then they have to comply, which means certain traditional practices 
will be affected. 
Although there was no mention of traditional farming practice in the first draft of the 
LCDS, Guyana’s R-Plan, also issued in June 2009, under the World Bank Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility did include some proposals that rotational farming would be 
targeted. A workshop held by the APA in June 2009 raised these issues and highlighted 
that the R-Plan aimed to “reduce the practice of slash and burn” in Amerindian 
communities and reduce “expansion” of farming (Amerindian Peoples Association and 
Forest Peoples Programme, 2009)—highlighting the term itself, slash and burn, was 
inappropriate and should be removed. The actual government position on this has been 
unclear throughout the process. In 2009 there were comments made at the National 
Toshaos Conference that rotational farming may have to stop (Forest Peoples 
Programme, 2009). However, a concept paper for the opt-in mechanism issued in 2010 
highlighted that it would be up to each village to decide what action would be taken, if 
any, with regards to rotational farming (Office of the President, Republic of Guyana, 
2010). Greater clarity is given in the latest version of the opt-in mechanism where it is 
highlighted that “Shifting/subsistence agriculture would not be classified as a driver of deforestation as 
reflected in the LCDS and the MRVS Roadmap” (Development Policy and Management 
Consultants (Guyana), 2017). 
In some communities the lands rights issues were more associated with other 
government policies and actions, rather than REDD+. In the village of Chenapou for 
example, lands rights issues were more associated with expansion of the neighbouring 
Kaieteur National Park. The Park, established under the British in 1929, was expanded 
greatly in 1999, with the village feeling that they had not been clearly consulted, and 
much of their traditional lands now lying within the Protected Area. The issue has 
dominated land rights issues in the area, with an interviewee who had studied the village 
commenting that in the early days of REDD+ lands rights issues were not seen as 
potentially a REDD+-related issue. The lands rights issue in Chenapou remains to this 
day with recent issues relating to incursions from miners from the village into the 
National Park (Stabroek News, 2017; Stabroek News, 2017). 
  
20 
5.2 Economic Opportunities 
A key aspect of early expectations of REDD+ amongst indigenous communities in 
Guyana were the potential economic opportunities that it could bring.  
A key example of this relates to the village of Chenapou. Along with neighbouring the 
Kaieteur National Park, the village is also the closest community to the proposed site of 
the Amaila Falls Hydropower project. In the early days of REDD+ and the LCDS, the 
village was divided on the support of the project or not.12 Older male members of the 
community supported the project because of the perceived economic benefits associated 
with the project, such as electricity, jobs and industries related to the project. Younger 
members, such as teachers, however, perceived greater threats to the village through the 
disruption to the forest and the rivers that the project may bring.  
The potential for indigenous communities to benefit from the REDD+ agreement was a 
clear theme of early consultation and awareness sessions. Indeed the LCDS had three 
distinct programmes designed at providing direct or indirect benefits to indigenous 
communities: the Amerindian Development Fund, Amerindian Land Titling and the 
Opt-in mechanism.  
A key concern, related to this hope, in the early consultations (and a well-founded one, 
as discussed below) was when funds and benefits would be received by the indigenous 
communities as a result of the REDD+ agreement and the LCDS. For example at the 
consultation held at Muritaro it was asked: 
How soon will funds be received? 
While a key comment at the consultation at Kato in Region 8 was: 
When will we see benefits of LCDS? 
Along with hopes there were also concerns regarding the status of key activities that 
sustain the livelihoods of indigenous (and other forest-dependent) communities. For 
example, the fifth most common comment in the initial consultation sessions was: 
Will livelihoods of Amerindians, miners and loggers be affected? 
The issue was raised in each of the regions involved in the consultation and reflects the 
concern that the REDD+ agreement would impinge on the activities that are being 
undertaken within, and outside indigenous communities to provide livelihoods. It is 
important to note here that mining activity provides important sources of income to 
many indigenous communities, and many indigenous individuals who work in gold 
mining areas. How this industry would be affected was thus an important concern for 
many in these areas.  
Linked to this concern was the importance of compensating those negatively affected by 
the introduction of the REDD+ agreement and the LCDS. The seventh most common 
                                                     
12 As reported to the author by an interviewee who had worked in the village at this time, and again in 2014.  
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suggestion in the initial consultations related to the importance of providing assistance to 
all of those affected: 
Assistance should be given to Amerindians, farmers, miners and loggers who will be affected by 
LCDS. 
5.3 Consultation 
The top three common suggestions raised at the initial consultation sessions reflect 
concerns regarding the consultation process on the LCDS and REDD+ itself: 
• 1st: The LCDS is difficult to understand. Simpler version is needed. Or pamphlet 
be made. 
• 2nd: People are ill prepared for the LCDS. Further discussions of LCDS with 
Villagers are needed. More information is needed or technical/legal advice. 
• 3rd: More time is needed for Amerindians to decide if they want to be part of 
Strategy. 
These comments reflect two main concerns of indigenous communities regarding 
REDD+ at the beginning of the process. First that the decisions were made rapidly 
without indigenous communities having sufficient time to reflect. Secondly, that the 
information provided was too technical and not within the grasp of many in the 
community.  
These concerns can be seen in comments from the consultation sessions including: 
Explanation is needed for LCDS, carbon sale, carbon market and intermediate land 
and 
Consultations: are inadequate, late, insufficient or one sided – not focused on the negatives. 
The speed of the launching of the policy, and the signing of the REDD+ agreement was 
certainly a surprise to some in the indigenous community: 
“Well it's a bit of a strange thing because what happened when government came up with that 
draft policy they didn't include too many people in it. But what they did later on was to have 
some consultations which was meant to have some input from all the stakeholders across Guyana, 
especially the indigenous people.”13 
The official consultative process relating to the LCDS (and implicitly thus the REDD+ 
agreement that underpins the strategy) began in June, 2009 with the national launching 
of the LCDS. A set of awareness and consultative meetings followed across the country, 
in which approximately 0.5 percent of the country attended (Laing T. , 2014). Official 
meetings were supplemented by the launching of an LCDS website, radio and TV 
programmes and consultations and awareness sessions held by NGOs such as 
Conservation International—Guyana and the APA (Laing T. , 2014).  
                                                     
13 Quote from prominent indigenous lawyer David James from Laing, (2014). 
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The scale of the process was certainly larger than anything attempted previously, 
although the consultations for the Amerindian Act was similar. The then Head of the 
Office of Climate Change, that had responsibility of the consultations commented in 
2011: 
“our stakeholder engagement for the LCDS is probably one of the most extensive that has 
happened anywhere. We had it independently monitored by IIED, and you can look at their 
reports.” 
The IIED referred to is an independent review by the International Institute for 
Environment & Development, hired by the Government of Guyana to conduct an 
independent review of the process. In their evaluation they generally concluded that the 
scale of the consultations was commendable but did highlight one particular negative 
regarding the non-engagement of the opposition members of Parliament and political 
parties in the process (Dow, Radzik, & Macqueen, 2009). 
Despite these findings other organisations focusing on indigenous people had other 
views. In November 2009 the Forest Peoples Programme found that:  
“During meetings on the LCDS, some Amerindian community members and leaders have 
complained that the information has not been provided in an appropriate form and have called 
on the government to tailor LCDS and related information to community needs.”14 
These initial fears about the scope and depth of consultations will be examined in more 
depth in Section 7 below.  
  
                                                     
14 Forest Peoples Programme, (2009) pp. 4 
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6. Deforestation Before and After the REDD+ 
Agreement 
The REDD+ agreement does not appear to have had significant short-term effects on 
the rate of deforestation as yet. Nevertheless, the deforestation rate in the country has 
remained below the agreed upon baseline for payments of 0.275 percent (Government 
of Guyana & Government of Norway, 2012) and well below the rates predicted by a 
2008 McKinsey study (Office of the President, 2008).  
Data on deforestation in Guyana should be used cautiously due to technical issues 
related to satellite imaging and extensive cloud cover, as well as changes in 
methodologies. Bellfield et al, (2015) report that the MRVS may be overstating the rate 
of deforestation based on a small-scale “ground truthing” exercise (though that exercise 
was not nationally representative). Consequently, deforestation data is imprecise and 
annual comparisons, in particular, should not be over interpreted. 
Keeping these qualifications in mind, it appears that deforestation increased sharply in 
the years just before and during the REDD+ agreement (See Figure 1). Deforestation 
seems to have peaked around 2012, at a rate almost 12 times higher than the 1990-2000 
average. When compared to the nation as a whole deforestation rates on Amerindian 
lands have been consistently lower. Even the spike that occurred in 2012 was only half 
of the spike that occurred nationally. 
Figure 1: Deforestation in Guyana (National) and in Amerindian Lands 
Source: Guyana Forestry Commission (2015). 
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This spike in deforestation can be attributed to the rapid increase in mining activity in 
the country, which was itself a response to increasing gold prices, immigration of 
Brazilian miners bringing new technology and equipment, and an influx of capital into 
the industry. According to the Guyana Forest Commission (GFC), the major driver of 
deforestation on Amerindian lands is gold mining. The GFC reported that in 2014, 91 
percent of deforestation in Amerindian areas was the result of mining, up from 46 
percent between 1990 and 2000. This is corroborated by comparisons of deforestation, 
Guyanese gold production, and gold prices (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Deforestation on Amerindian Lands, Gold Production & Gold Prices 
(1995-2015) 
Sources: Guyana Forestry Commission (2015); www.kitco.com; and Guyana Geology and Mines Commission. 
Other causes of deforestation have been declining. Fires accounted for 47 percent of 
deforestation between 1990 and 2000 but none of the deforestation in 2014. As a result 
of the improved MRVS, GFC was also able to report the quantity of forest degradation 
that occurred due to shifting agriculture in 2013 and 2014, with 471 hectares and 64 
hectares being degraded respectively, as compared to total degradation of 4,353 hectares 
in 2013 and 4,238 hectares in 2014 across the State Forest Estate, State Lands and 
Amerindian areas.  
The expansion of gold mining occurred at almost the same time as the REDD+ 
agreement was signed, making it difficult to discern the impact, if any, that would be 
attributable to that agreement. Attribution would also require clarifying the mechanisms 
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by which the agreement should have influenced the rate of deforestation. LCDS lacked 
direct mechanisms through which finance received from Norway would impact 
deforestation.15 Even if the LCDS had been fully implemented, any impact in indigenous 
communities and across the forest estate as a whole, would have been indirect and long-
term, resulting from the promotion of economic activity and rising incomes in 
sustainable low-carbon activities. Alternatively, had the government recognized the 
accelerating impact of gold mining, it might have adapted its LCDS strategy to better 
regulate and minimize the impact of this unforeseen expansion. It is only now that 
projects are underway to attempt to integrate REDD+ and mining together. For 
example, NORAD has funded a Conservation International project that engages with 
the mining sector to improve practices to reduce deforestation.16 
Within indigenous communities themselves, REDD+ financing has done little to 
encourage behavioural changes, whether through regulation that would forbid practices 
or through incentive schemes such as the opt-in mechanism. It is impossible to prove 
that the agreement has had no impact on deforestation in Guyana compared to some 
counterfactual in which REDD+ did not exist, but the fact that deforestation has risen 
overall in indigenous communities, combined with weak implementation of policies, 
suggests that REDD+ has had little overall effect, one way or the other, on deforestation 
in indigenous communities. 
  
                                                     
15 For further discussion on the impacts of the REDD+ finance on the forest sector pathway see Laing, 
(2015). 
16 More information is available at https://www.norad.no/en/front/funding/climate-and-forest-initiative-
support-scheme/grants-2013-2015/projects/reducing-deforestation-by-working-with-policymakers/ 
26 
7. Evolution of the REDD+ Agreement in Guyana 
This section examines how the REDD+ agreement in Guyana was managed, and how 
the agreement has affected indigenous communities. 
In terms of projects being implemented and cash from the REDD+ agreement reaching 
the ground implementation has been extremely slow. Despite the agreement being 
initially signed in 2009 the first delivery of cash into the fund established for REDD+ 
finance, the Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF), did not occur until late 2010 
(The World Bank Group, 2010). This was due to institutional issues in the World Bank, 
the entity appointed to manage the fund, including taking a year to set-up a bank account 
(Office of Climate Change, 2013)—creating significant tension between Guyana and the 
Bank.17 This tension could have contributed to the changing of delivery partner of FCPF 
funds from the Bank to the Inter-American Development Bank in 2011 (Stabroek News, 
2011).  
Speed of delivery continued to be slow even with the bank account established. Guyana 
received the first tranche of finance in 2010, but by mid-2013 only 20 percent of 
received finance (and just 5 percent of the total pledged) had been delivered (Laing T. , 
2014). A number of issues contributed to the slowness of this delivery, but some 
commentators have attributed this to a complex system of safeguards that needed to be 
satisfied to access money, and a lack of capacity within the Government of Guyana to 
structure suitable project proposals to navigate these safeguards. The system constructed 
required that projects effectively pass two external bars to be financed. For funds to be 
disbursed from the GRIF authorisation is required from a steering committee 
comprising members of the Governments of Guyana and Norway and international civil 
society, although no specific criteria for approval have been outlined. Funds are then 
disbursed to the relevant Government of Guyana department via partner entities (the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank). This structure creates layers of safeguards as 
all projects must meet the approval of the GRIF steering committee as well as the 
explicit safeguards of the relevant partner entities. This structure was supported by a 
representative of the largest Indigenous NGO in the country, the APA, although has 
proved to be cumbersome and has been a contributor of the slow delivery of finance to 
the ground in Guyana (Laing T. , 2014). The partner entities have played a twin role of 
project approver and project developer—working closely with government agencies to 
develop proposals. For this they have received administrative costs. Given the slow 
speed of delivery of finance these administrative fees have accounted for a large share of 
early disbursed finance—accounting for almost 20 percent of finance disbursed up to 
late 2014 (Laing T. , 2014).18 The issue has been exacerbated by the limited capacity of 
                                                     
17 In 2010 the then President Jagdeo commented at the National Toshaos Conference: “Let us send a clear 
message to the international community that they must get out of the way and allow us to move forward with our development” 
and “I hope that whilst you are here that you also send a clear signal to the international community who sometimes, because of 
distance, and sometimes because they have some real silly, useless people, don’t care.” (Kaieteur News, 2010). 
18 The 20% was calculated via the Trustee Reports of the GRIF published by the World Bank. 
Administrative fees consisted of both the fees charged by the World Bank for acting as trustee and the 
project administrative fees charged by project partners such as the UNDP and the IDB. The high level was 
thus due to both high levels of administrative costs, and slow disbursement of actual project finance. 
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the Government of Guyana. The agency responsible for coordinating project proposals, 
and ultimately for their submission under the previous government was the Project 
Management Office within the Office of the President. However, as highlighted by the 
IDB the unit was “constrained by its human resources capacity and lack of budgetary resources to 
carry out its mandated duties.”19  
The overall slow delivery of finance has led to extremely slow delivery of projects, 
especially those most relevant to indigenous communities. The land titling programme 
began finally in 201320 and the Amerindian Development Fund in 2012.21 The opt-in 
programme is yet to begin with concerns over lands-rights issues and consultation 
processes with indigenous communities delaying the implementation greatly (Stabroek 
News, 2016), although a pilot community, Muritaro, has recently been chosen. The 
Amaila Falls hydropower project has met a series of severe challenges, with the private 
sector pulling out in 2013 (Stabroek News, 2013), in the light of major parliamentary 
opposition and criticism from a number of quarters, including indigenous organisations 
(Anselmo & Almas, 2017) and the new government finally pulled the project in October 
2017 (Stabroek News, 2017) with the finance to be used for the project from the 
REDD+ agreement (US$ 80 million) to be diverted to alternative low-carbon energy 
sources. These delays in tangible results in related projects has resulted in a perceived 
scepticism regarding REDD+ in indigenous communities, according to the interviewees 
to this study. For example, in the village of Chenapou, in which, at the start of the 
agreement, there was optimism amongst many members of the community that the 
Amaila Falls Hydropower project could bring economic benefits, this optimism has 
evaporated.  
The implementation of projects themselves has also led to this feeling of scepticism 
regarding the scale of benefits initially promised. This is especially evident in the 
Amerindian Development Fund project. The project is intended to provide “support for 
the socio-economic and environmental development of Amerindian communities and villages.”22 The 
project was structured so that villages would decide their own projects, via Community 
Development Plans (CDPs), and would receive a maximum of G$5 million 
(approximately US$25,000) to implement the chosen project from these plans. Two 
phases of the project have so far been completed with Phase 1 funding projects in 26 
communities, expanding to 137 communities in Phase 2. Disbursement is based on 
solely on the CDP and the project and has no stipulation relating to deforestation.  
The project has been much critiqued, however, by both indigenous communities and 
non-governmental bodies alike for a number of reasons. Indigenous communities 
criticised the figure of G$5 million as being too small to implement meaningful projects 
                                                     
19 Inter-American Development Bank (2011) pp. 5 
20 For more details on the project see 
http://www.gy.undp.org/content/guyana/en/home/operations/projects/environment_and_energy/ameri
ndian-land-titling.html 
21 For further information see 
http://www.gy.undp.org/content/guyana/en/home/operations/projects/poverty_reduction/project_samp
le.html 
22 Quote from project website at: 
http://www.gy.undp.org/content/guyana/en/home/operations/projects/poverty_reduction/project_samp
le.html 
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that could achieve long-term change in communities. The creation of the plans has also 
been criticised with the view that this phase was rushed and communities were not given 
sufficient support to develop long-term plans. There was also the view that the project 
was hijacked by political considerations and used to fund villages where votes needed to 
be bought. Although there were attempts at capacity building in project planning and 
management, this was perceived by communities to be inadequate and too short (often 
training took place in 3-4 days, when communities deemed that months would be 
required). The split implementation between the UNDP and the Ministry of Indigenous 
Peoples Affairs also raised concerns, with comments made regarding the large travel 
allowances used to reward staff travelling to communities, money that could have been 
directed straight to community development, and a sense of blame-shifting between the 
UNDP and the Ministry when failures occurred. Confusion also arises with the project 
due to its similarities with other forms of financial disbursement to Amerindian 
communities. Communities can also receive annual disbursements via the Presidential 
Grants programme, and confusingly from another Amerindian Development Fund 
(called the Amerindian Development Fund—National Budgetary allocation—funded by 
royalties from the mining industry) that funds Capital projects in communities. This 
myriad of varied funding sources has meant that, in the opinion of one interviewee, there 
was confusion between what projects were funded by REDD+ and what were general 
government support. 
This combination of tricky implementation and slow delivery seems to have raised a 
general sense of scepticism regarding REDD+ amongst communities in Guyana. This is 
evidenced by a quote from the current Toshao of the Muritaro community (the pilot 
community for the opt-in mechanism). He commented: “I’m trying to get the villagers to give 
it a chance. And it if doesn’t succeed then all we have to do is Opt-out.”23 How this increased 
scepticism impacts future implementation of REDD+ in Guyana remains to be seen. 
The slow pace of REDD+ implementation in Guyana has been due, in part, to poor 
implementation and weak capacity, but also to the demands created by safeguard 
requirements included in the agreement. 
Indeed the potential for the safeguard requirements to undermine the whole LCDS was 
highlighted in the recent evaluation report of Norway’s Climate and Finance Initiative 
that manages the REDD+ agreement from Norway’s end (NORAD, 2017). Streamlining 
or eliminating such safeguards, however, is extremely unlikely and fully meeting 
international safeguards relating to REDD+, in the view of some indigenous groups, 
may require major legal and regulatory reforms that go far beyond issues related directly 
to REDD+ (Dooley & Griffiths, 2014). Thus, scepticism about future benefits from 
REDD+ is likely to be warranted in part because of the demands imposed on how it is 
implemented. 
  
                                                     
23 Personal communication from Toshao of Muritaro, September 18, 2017 
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7.1 Management and Consultation 
A key issue that has been central to the implementation of REDD+ in Guyana, and its 
impact on the forest, economy, and indigenous communities in Guyana is that of 
management and consultation.  
Up until the change of government in 2015 the REDD+ agreement was managed via 
two government offices, housed within the Office of the President and reporting directly 
to the President. The Office of Climate Change was described by the then head as: 
 “the focal point for the preparations for the LCDS, the process which we went through in having 
the LCDS prepared, launched, the extensive national stakeholder engagements, and now the 
implementation phase of the LCDS.”  
The Project Management Office was described by the Head of the Office of Climate 
Change as  
“responsible for the implementation of the LCDS projects, or the implementation process for 
that. So we have the GRIF which is the body that approves projects. Projects are submitted 
jointly by the implementing agency and a partner entity. The PMO would facilitate this 
process.”24 
The centralised nature of management of REDD+ in Guyana was reflective of wider 
governance trends (Bulkan J. , 2016) and may have helped contribute to both the speed 
at which the initial agreement was entered into, and also the slow delivery of finance 
(Laing T. , 2014).  
To allay fears regarding the lack of wider involvement in the process the government 
established a Multi-Stakeholder Steering Committee (MSSC) to initially manage the 
primary consultation process for the LCDS, and later to take on a wider mandate 
regarding the LCDS as a whole including receiving updates and discussing projects under 
the LCDS, reviewing and discussing various Terms of References and proposals and 
discussing Guyana’s involvement in international for a related to REDD+ . The MSSC 
consisted of members of government ministries and agencies, and invited members of 
NGOs and civil society in the country. The establishment of the MSSC was a laudable 
attempt to broaden environmental governance further than had occurred previously in 
Guyana. However, it encountered a number of problems including the lack of inclusion 
of parliamentary opposition, perceptions of domination by senior government officials 
and the lack of a clear mandate or terms of reference. This latter point was the key 
reason reported as to why the largest indigenous peoples NGO in the country, the APA 
refused to participate on the committee. The absence of the APA from the committee 
was lamented by the organisation themselves, and highlighted a crucial missed 
opportunity to involve a key organisation in the consultation and management process 
for REDD+ in Guyana. Overall the effectiveness of the MSSC has been called into 
question25 and has received specific criticism from an independent assessment 
                                                     
24 Quotes from Shyam Nokta, as quoted in Laing, (2014).  
25 For a detailed analysis of the role of the MSSC see Laing, (2014). 
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conducted by the Rainforest Alliance, suggesting that it was not a forum that welcomed 
dissent (Donovan, Clarke, & Sloth, 2010). 
The initiation of the MSSC heralded the start of a consultation process, discussed above. 
Aspects of this consultation process has been praised, such as the overall scale, and 
aspects criticised, such as the non-engagement of the opposition political parties (Dow, 
Radzik, & MacQueen, 2009). However, since this initial burst of activity there has been a 
lack of consultative activity. There has been few follow-ups to this initial exercise, at least 
from the government perspective. This lack of activity has meant that it was the 
perception of many of the interviewees that communities and indigenous people do not 
feel that they have been adequately consulted regarding the process, and do not feel fully 
informed regarding the process (see also Laing, (2015)). 
Observations on the initial consultative activity raised the question of whether it was 
more of a brief awareness activity rather than a consultation. This perception is echoed 
by the APA who commented that “the information was too poor to make a good picture of what 
might happen. Poor information divided families, divided communities. All you heard was that you were 
going to get money for keeping your forests.”26 
These views were echoed by representatives of other villages, a general sense that not 
sufficient knowledge existed amongst communities to make informed decisions. One 
interesting aspect that has emerged in this setting is the role of indigenous NGO bodies 
as gate-keepers to information regarding REDD+. Both the APA and the North 
Rupununi District Development Board (NRDDB) (an NGO representing 16 
communities in the North Rupununi area of the country27) commented that they had 
built their own capacity regarding REDD+ (often with international support) in order to 
pass on their expertise and knowledge to the indigenous communities that they work 
with. The NRDDB commented that due to the slow process at which REDD+ has 
actually hit the ground in Guyana some of this work has gone to waste as they have 
trained individuals but they are searching of ways to effectively utilise them. 
A further important observation regarding the consultation aspect of REDD+ in 
Guyana was the importance of discussing how REDD+ may differentially affect the 
varied communities, landscapes and livelihoods amongst the indigenous population. 
However, it was the perception of many of the interviewees that the information 
provided on REDD+ was too one-dimensional—focusing on the perspective that 
REDD+ would bring cash to indigenous communities. This had the twin effect of 
raising expectations regarding the cash that would flow to indigenous communities, and 
also obscuring the complexities involved and the potential differential effects across 
communities. 
The dramatic drop-off between the level of focus on providing information and 
engaging with indigenous communities on REDD+ can be witnessed by contrasting the 
National Toshao Conferences of 2010 and 2017.28 In 2010 REDD+ was fully on the 
                                                     
26 Personal communication from representative of the APA September 4, 2017. 
27 For more information on the NRDDB see http://nrddb.org/. 
28 The National Toshaos Conference is an annual gathering of the Toshaos of all titled indigenous 
communities in the country. 
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agenda with the Conference signing a REDD+ Resolution supporting the LCDS 
(Guyana Chronicle, 2010), although this was not without controversy with some 
Toshaos alleging that pressure was placed on them to sign a rushed resolution (Forest 
Peoples Programme, 2010). In contrast in 2017, according to a government official, 
there was nothing on REDD+ at the conference—despite requests from the NTC that 
information be presented. 
7.2 Land Rights 
As highlighted above the broad-based issue of land rights is arguably the most important 
to indigenous communities generally. However, in the context of REDD+ it seems that 
fears of land-grabbing that are discussed in other countries were not large in the 
consciousness nor were realised. Instead what has happened is a general failure to 
resolve historical outstanding land rights issues that are required to be resolved before 
any REDD+ scheme involving indigenous communities could be adequately 
implemented. The seven years that have passed since the beginning of the REDD+ 
agreement has not seen any clear resolution regarding issues surrounding customary land 
rights, conflicts between extractive industries and indigenous communities, and the 
rights of non-titled communities. Indeed conflicts between extractive industries and 
indigenous communities have arguably intensified with the gold rush in the country, and 
it was perceived that these issues have dominated those related to REDD+ in villages 
such as Chenapou.  
One area for initial optimism in the construction of the LCDS, according to the APA, 
was the inclusion of the Amerindian Land Titling Project. This had the potential to 
resolve many of the long-standing issues and provide resolution to the claims for title 
and extension for many villages. The project aimed to grant title to those communities 
that were eligible under the criteria outlined in the Amerindian Act, but had not yet 
completed the process, and also to resolve issues around extensions claimed by many 
indigenous communities. Despite the potential there was a general sense that many of 
the issues had not been resolved and that although there has been progress it has been 
slow and concerns have been raised regarding the abuse of political power in the 
process.29 The slowness of progress in this area can be seen comparing targets with 
achievement. The aim of the project is to complete 45 absolute grants and providing 
certificates of title to 68 villages. As of the end of 2016 only 7 absolute grants had been 
issued, and only 15 certificates of title had been issued (UNDP, 2016), although more 
progress had been made on the training and communication aspects of the project, 
though this was critiqued by indigenous NGOs due to the lack of information and 
reports regarding training and visits. 
A conceptual critique of the Land Titling project also came from one interviewee who 
represented an international NGO. With the land titling project being run mainly by the 
UNDP there was a sense that these crucial decisions regarding tenure and land 
ownership were effectively being “outsourced” to a foreign agency with the associated 
loss of sovereignty. This critique is interesting as it would seem that the involvement of a 
foreign agency may help to solve some of the issues relating to the abuse of political 
                                                     
29 Personal communication from APA, September 4, 2017. 
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power discussed by some interviewees, however other interviewees saw this approach as 
problematic, and valued the sovereignty of the process over potential political 
involvement. 
7.3 Changing Perspectives  
An important effect of REDD+ in Guyana, both positive and negative, has been the 
role the agreement has played in indirectly changing perspectives, polices and 
approaches. Indeed this indirect effect of REDD+ may have occurred despite the lack 
of solid on-the-ground activities.  
At the inception of the programme there was a sense amongst some in the indigenous 
community that the programme was being imposed on the country from external actors, 
and that it was a result of foreign countries not being willing to change their action, and 
telling Guyanese communities what to do. There was also a sense that indigenous 
communities in Guyana had been protecting lands for generations, but were now being 
told to do the same—and if they were to be rewarded money should flow.  
A fear that has emerged amongst some of the interviewees is the erosion of some of 
these perspectives, and the cultural tradition of forest protection and resource 
management, with the creation of a price incentive. By monetising an ongoing practice it 
may be that the cultural perspective is lost and that if the money dries up then 
deforestation could rise. To date there is little tangible evidence about whether this has 
occurred or not, particularly due to the lack of REDD+ finance actually received by 
indigenous communities. Other interviewees did however comment on the perception 
that indigenous communities were increasingly seeking land title to secure land for 
economic purposes whether for future REDD+ payments or for mineral deposits. Again 
tangible evidence is scanty but if true this perception could represent the sort of shift in 
cultural traditions highlighted by the interviewees. 
Although the tangible impacts from finance received via the REDD+ agreement are 
small, a greater potential impact has come from an overall change in mindset in policy-
making and donor support in the country. REDD+ has become engrained in much of 
the policy-making in the country (at least in words if not fully in deeds). For example, 
even though the REDD+ agreement and the LCDS was the creation of the previous 
President Bharrat Jagdeo, and was closely associated with him personally, the main gist 
of low-carbon development is being preserved in a new Green State Development 
Strategy, the development of which is being funded through the GRIF (News Room 
Guyana, 2017).  
The overall shift in the country’s policy trajectory towards REDD+ and low-carbon 
development (at least on paper) has been used by a number of government agencies and 
non-governmental organisations to implement policy and attract international finance. 
For example, Conservation International – Guyana has attracted finance for projects 
relating to down-scaling the LCDS to small and medium enterprises in the Rupununi 
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region of the country that contains predominantly indigenous communities.30 The 
project had a number of key components including: conducting a baseline greenhouse 
gas, climate change and economic assessment of the region; facilitating a business, 
community and government network for climate-responsive development in the region; 
providing targeted support to tourism and agricultural based enterprises such as 
developing business plans and establishing a Rupununi Innovation Revolving Fund 
within a local financial institution to provide low-cost finance to climate-friendly 
enterprises. The project thus mirrored elements of the national LCDS such as 
understanding emissions and the context, and providing financial and technical support 
to low-carbon enterprises to reduce pressure on the forest and promote wider 
development. A second project that has just begun involves linking REDD+ in the 
country to the mining sector.31 This intangible impact from REDD+, in shifting the 
overall policy environment, may prove to be more substantial in the long-term, than the 
direct impacts from projects implemented through the GRIF with funds direct from the 
Norway agreement. 
One potential impact of the REDD+ programme, though again not directly related to 
the REDD+ agreement, as discussed by a number of the interviewees, has been the 
general increase in awareness of climate change, and its impacts amongst the indigenous 
population. There is no clear baseline to test this impact, and little data on the current 
state of knowledge, but it was certainly an impact attributed by individuals working with 
multiple indigenous communities in the country. Although the consultation programme 
by the government on REDD+ has been limited since the initial push, as noted there 
have been programmes by a variety of non-governmental organisations which may have 
increased the overall level of awareness.  
  
                                                     
30 See http://www.fomin.org/en-
us/HomeOld2015/Projects/ProjectDatabase/ProjectProfile/tabid/85/prj/GY-M1021/language/en-
US/Default.aspx for more information.  
31 See https://www.norad.no/en/front/funding/climate-and-forest-initiative-support-scheme/grants-2013-
2015/projects/reducing-deforestation-by-working-with-policymakers/ for more information. 
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8. Discussion and Conclusions 
Guyana and Norway set out to create a REDD+ model for the world: 
“Tropical deforestation must receive the same level of attention, resources, intellect and innovation 
as other global problems and partnership is the key to achieving this. Guyana is prepared to be 
a model for the world in devising these partnerships,” President Jagdeo (GINA, 2008) 
“We are giving the world a workable model for climate change collaboration between North and 
South. It's not perfect, but it's good, and it will be improved upon as we learn and develop 
together.” Minister Solheim (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2009). 
However, as of 2017, an interviewee in response to a question on how they thought 
REDD+ has affected indigenous people responded:  
“Is anyone affected (asks rhetorically)? There are some funds for projects...but what’s the impact? 
... I don’t think it has impacted Indigenous People in a significant way.” 
This is an interesting summary of what has proved to be a tricky start to REDD+ 
implementation in the country. The initial stage of REDD+ was met with optimism, 
worry, concerns and a hive of consultative activity. This quickly drained away as delivery 
of finance was slow, and the promise of benefits generally failed to materialise. Costs to 
indigenous communities seem to have been small to negligible, as traditional activities 
have generally continued with no grand land expropriations for REDD+. Benefits, 
however, also seem to have been small, with slow progress on land titling, some 
development funds, and provision of some renewable energy. In terms of tangible 
REDD+-related finance the numbers are paltry compared to initial expectations. The 
opt-in mechanism, which should have provided the bulk of REDD+ finance to 
communities, has yet to be implemented, and communities have generally only received 
some solar panels and a US$25,000 grant. This lack of tangible benefits has created an air 
of scepticism about any future benefits emerging. Table 2 provides a summary of the key 
hopes and fears for REDD+ in indigenous communities, and how these hopes or fears 
have evolved across the timeline of the agreement.  
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Table 2: Summary of key hopes and fears for REDD+ in indigenous 
communities  
Major hope/fear for 
REDD+ in indigenous 
communities 
Mechanism for Impact Have hopes/fears been realized? Why/Why Not 
Resolution of historic lands 
rights issues 
Amerindian Land Titling 
(ALT) Project; 
Potential future legal reform 
Some titling of communities; Many 
issues remain due to lack of legal 
reform and slow implementation of 
ALT project. 
Expropriation of indigenous 
land for REDD+ activity 
Seizing of land by government 
or private actors 
No evidence of land seizures relating 
to REDD+; Lack of decentralized 
REDD+ payments reduces incentive 
for private seizures. 
Economic development 
through infrastructure 
projects such as hydropower 
Jobs arising from Amaila Falls 
hydropower project 
No economic impact as project was 
cancelled. 
Threats to forests and 
communities from 
infrastructure  
Flooding from dam, 
deforestation from road, 
social damage from influx of 
workers, loggers and miners. 
Minimal impacts as project was 
cancelled. Road was completed and 
may bring some future impacts. 
Economic development 
through community 
development projects and 
REDD+ payments 
Projects funded through 
Amerindian Development 
Fund and payments through 
the opt-in mechanisms 
Some benefits through funded 
projects. Opt-in mechanism yet to 
begin. 
Traditional activities will be 
stopped via REDD+ related 
regulation 
Cessation of rotational 
farming via government 
regulation 
No regulation affecting rotational 
farming. 
Lack of involvement of 
indigenous people in deciding 
REDD+ activities 
Decision-making occurs 
without consultation, lack of 
representation of indigenous 
communities on bodies such 
as the MSSC. 
Concerns about aspects of 
consultation process; Lack 
continuation after early effort. 
Minimal involvement of indigenous 
communities on bodies such as 
MSSC. 
The paucity of both benefits and costs (through the slow delivery of finance) could be 
attributed in part, to the complex nature of the institutional structure created through 
which REDD+ finance flowed.32 The system involved various national and multilateral 
actors and meant that a number of safeguards had to be met for projects to be 
implemented. The limited capacity of the small government in Guyana has meant that it 
has proved tricky to create proposals, and then implement projects that meet these 
criteria. Worst case scenario costs to indigenous communities have been avoided, 
although it is difficult to judge the role that safeguards have played in this regard, given 
                                                     
32 See Laing (2014) for a more detailed discussion.  
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the view of many actors of the (lack of) extent to which safeguards have been upheld. 
They do however seem to have delayed finance. 
Greater impacts from the REDD+ agreement may only accrue to the country in the 
long-term if shifts in mind-set within government can be translated from paper to action, 
and if the slow mainstreaming of REDD+ and low-carbon development into the 
country, through NGOs as much as government, continues.  
Despite its problems REDD+ and green development more generally has proved to be 
durable in Guyana, even surviving major changes in government—even more surprising 
given that it was initially the realm of a small number of government officials in one 
political party. This bodes well for its long-term future in the country.  
The greatest challenges are however likely still to come with important questions of how 
finance could accrue to indigenous communities via an opt-in mechanism that has yet to 
be piloted still to be resolved. And perhaps the greatest challenge is how REDD+ 
finance can interact with the activity that is the largest driver of deforestation, the largest 
export earner, and a major concern for indigenous communities, mining. This was a 
notable omission from early plans and projects and is only now starting to become a 
focus. However, with Guyana on the cusp of becoming a major oil exporter whether the 
focus on REDD+ as a vehicle for development and environmental management will 
remain is an open question.  
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
Name:  
 
Organisation: 
 
1. How would you rate your knowledge of REDD+? 
 
Very Good  
Good  
Average  
Poor  
Very Poor  
 
2. When you first heard about REDD+ what were your impressions? 
 
3. Thinking back to 2010  
 
a) What impacts did you think that REDD+ might have upon indigenous 
communities in general? 
 
b) Specifically thinking about your community (organisation), what impacts did 
you think REDD+ might have upon your community (organisation)? 
 
c) Still thinking of 2010 how would you rate your level of concern about 
REDD+? 
Very Concerned  
Slightly concerned  
Not concerned  
Optimistic  
Very optimistic  
 
d) What aspects of REDD+ were you most optimistic about? 
 
e) What aspects of REDD+ were you most concerned about? 
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4. Now thinking about today, 
 
a) How do you think REDD+ in Guyana has affected indigenous people 
generally? 
 
b) How has REDD+ affected your community (organisation) specifically? 
 
 
 
c) What is your current level of concern about REDD+? 
Very Concerned  
Slightly concerned  
Not concerned or optimistic  
Optimistic  
Very optimistic  
 
d) What current aspects of REDD+ make you most optimistic? 
 
e) What current aspects of REDD+ make you most concerned? 
 
 
 
